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Categorization systems are widely studied in psychology, sociology, and organization theory as
information-structuringdevices which are critical to decision-making processes. In the present paper,
we introduce a sound and complete epistemic logic of categories and agents’ categorical perception.
The Kripke-style semantics of this logic is given in terms of data structures based on two domains:
one domain representing objects (e.g. market products) and one domain representing the features of
the objects which are relevant to the agents’ decision-making. We use this framework to discuss
and propose logic-based formalizations of some core concepts from psychological, sociological, and
organizational research in categorization theory.
1 Introduction
Categories (understood as types of collective identities for broad classes of objects or of agents) are the
most basic cognitive tools, and are key to the use of language, the construction of knowledge and iden-
tity, and the formation of agents’ evaluations and decisions. The literature on categorization is expanding
rapidly, motivated by–and in connection with–the theories and methodologies of a wide range of fields
in the social sciences and AI. For instance, in linguistics, categories are central to the mechanisms of
grammar generation [7]; in AI, classification techniques are core to pattern recognition, data mining,
text mining and knowledge discovery in databases; in sociology, categories are used to explain the con-
struction of social identity [21]; in management science, categories are used to predict how products and
producers will be perceived and evaluated by consumers and investors [20, 24, 37, 31, 1].
In [4], we proposed the framework of a positive (i.e. negation-free and implication-free) normal
multi-modal logic as an epistemic logic of categories and agents’ categorical perception, and discussed
its algebraic and Kripke-style semantics. In the present paper, we introduce a simpler and more general
framework than [4], in which the (rather technical) restrictions on the Kripke-style models of [4] are
dropped. We use this logical framework to formalize core notions developed and applied in the fields
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mentioned above, with a focus on those relevant to management science, as a step towards building
systematic connections between modern categorization theory and epistemic logic.
Structure of the paper. In Section 2, we briefly review the main views on the foundations of catego-
rization theory together with the formal approaches inspired by some of these views. In Section 3, we
discuss the basic framework of the epistemic logic of categories. We introduce its refined Kripke-style
semantics and axiomatization, together with two language enrichments involving a common knowledge-
type construction and hybrid-style nominal (and co-nominal) variables, respectively. In Section 4, we
discuss a number of core categorization-theoretic notions from business science and our proposed for-
malizations of them. In Section 5, we discuss further directions. In the appendix (Section A), we discuss
the soundness and completeness of the logics introduced in Section 3.
2 Categorization: foundations and formal approaches
In the present section we review the main views, insights, and approaches to the foundations of catego-
rization theory and to the formal models capturing these. Our account is necessarily incomplete. We
refer the reader to [2] for an exhaustive overview.
2.1 Extant foundational approaches
The literature on the foundations of categorization theory displays a variety of definitions, theories,
models, and methods, each of which capturing some key facets of categorization. The classical theory
of categorization [35] goes back to Aristotle, and is based on the insight that all members of a category
share some fundamental features which define their membership. Accordingly, categorization is viewed
as a deductive process of reasoning with necessary and sufficient conditions, resulting in categories with
sharp boundaries, which are represented equally well by any of their members. The classical view has
inspired influential approaches in machine learning such as conceptual clustering [11]. However, this
view runs into difficulties when trying to accommodate a new object or entity which would intuitively
be part of a given category but does not share all the defining features of the category. Other difficulties,
e.g. providing an exhaustive list of defining features, unclear cases, and the existence of members of
given categories which are judged to be better representatives of the whole class than others, motivated
the introduction of prototype theory [26, 34]. This theory regards categorization as the inductive process
of finding the best match between the features of an object and those of the closest prototype(s). Prototype
theory addresses the above mentioned problems of the classical theory by relaxing the requirement that
membership be decided through the satisfaction of an exhaustive list of features. It allows for unclear
cases and embraces the empirically verified intuition that people regard membership in most categories
as a matter of degrees, with certain members being more central (or prototypical) than others. (For
instance, robins are regarded as prototypical birds, while penguins are not.) To account for how an ex-
ante prototype is generated in the mind of agents, the exemplar theory [36] was proposed, according
to which individuals make category judgments by comparing new stimuli with instances already stored
in memory (the “exemplars”). However, the existence of instances or prototypes of a given category
presupposes that this category has already been defined. Hence, both the prototype and the exemplar
view run into a circularity problem. Moreover, it has been argued that similarity-based theories of cate-
gorization (such as the prototype and the exemplar view) fail to address the problem of explaining ‘why
we have the categories we have’, or, in other words, why certain categories seem to be more cogent and
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coherent than others. Even more fundamentally, similarity might be imposed rather than discovered (do
things belong in the same category because they are similar, or are they similar because they belong
in the same category?), i.e. similarity might be the effect of conceptual coherence rather than its cause.
Pivoting on the notion of coherence for category-formation, the theory-based view on categorization
[29] posits that categories arise in connection with theories (broadly understood so as to include also
informal explanations). For instance, ice, water and steam can be grouped together in the same category
on the basis of the theory of phases in physical chemistry. The coherence of categories proceeds from
the coherence of the theories on which they are based. This view of categorization allows one to group
together entities which would be scored as dissimilar using different methods; for instance, it allows to
group together a gold watch, the school report of one’s grandfather, and the ownership of a piece of land
in the category of “things one wants one’s children to inherit”, which is based on one’s theory of what
family is. However, the theory-based view does not account for the intuition that categories themselves
are the building blocks of theory-formation, which again results in a circularity problem. Summing up,
the extant views on categorization (the classical [35], prototype [26, 34], exemplar [36], and theory-
based [29]) are difficult to reconcile and merge into a satisfactory overarching theory accommodating all
the insights into categorization that researchers in the different fields have been separately developing.
The present paper is one of the first steps of a research program aimed at clarifying notions developed
independently, and at developing a common ground which can hopefully facilitate the build-up of such
a theory.
2.2 Extant formal approaches
Conceptual spaces. The formal approach to the representation of categories and concepts which is
perhaps the most widely adopted in social science and management science is the one introduced by
Ga¨rdenfors, which is based on conceptual spaces [15]. These are multi-dimensional geometric struc-
tures, the components of which (the quality dimensions) are intended to represent basic features –
e.g. colour, pitch, temperature, weight, time, price – by which objects (represented as points in the
product space of these dimensions) can be meaningfully compared. Each dimension is endowed with
its appropriate geometric (e.g. metric, topological) structure. Concept-formation in conceptual spaces is
modelled according to a similarity-based view of concepts. Specifically, if each dimension of a concep-
tual space has a metric, these metrics translate in a notion of distance between the objects represented
in the space, which models their similarity, so that the closer their distance, the more similar they are.
Concepts (i.e. formal categories) are represented as convex sets of the conceptual space1. The geometric
center of any such concept is a natural interpretation of the prototype of that concept.
Formal Concept Analysis. A very different approach, Formal Concept Analysis (FCA) [14], is a
method of data analysis based on Birkhoff’s representation theory of complete lattices [8]. In FCA,
databases are represented as formal contexts, i.e. structures (A,X , I) such that A and X are sets, and
I ⊆ A×X is a binary relation. Intuitively, A is understood as a collection of objects, X as a collection of
features, and for any object a and feature x, the tuple (a,x) belongs to I exactly when object a has feature
x. Every formal context (A,X , I) can be associated with the collection of its formal concepts, i.e. the
tuples (B,Y ) such that B ⊆ A, Y ⊆ X , and B×Y is a maximal rectangle included in I. The set B is the
extent of the formal concept (B,Y ), and Y is its intent. Because of maximality, the extent of a formal
1A subset is convex if it includes the segments between any two of its points. In the Euclidian plane, squares are convex
while stars are not.
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concept uniquely identifies and is identified by its intent. Formal concepts can be partially ordered;
namely, (B,Y ) is a subconcept of (C,Z) exactly when B⊆C, or equivalently, when Z⊆Y . Ordered in this
way, the concepts of a formal context form a complete lattice (i.e., the least upper bound and the greatest
lower bound of every collection of formal concepts exist), and by Birkhoff’s theorem, every complete
lattice is isomorphic to some concept lattice. The link established by FCA between complete lattices
and the formalization of concepts (or categories) captures an aspect of categories which is very much
highlighted in the categorization theory literature. Namely, categories never occur in isolation; rather,
they arise in the context of categorization systems (e.g. taxonomies), which are typically organized in
hierarchies of super- (i.e. less specified) and sub- (i.e. more specified) categories. While most approaches
identify concepts with their extent, in FCA, intent and extent of a concept are treated on a par, i.e., the
intent of a concept is just as essential as its extent. While FCA has tried to connect itself with various
cognitive and philosophical theories of concept-formation, it is most akin to the classical view.
Formal concepts as modal models. In [4], we first established a connection between FCA and modal
logic, based on the idea that (enriched) formal contexts can be taken as models of an epistemic modal
logic of categories/concepts. Formulas of this logic are constructed out of a set of atomic variables us-
ing the standard positive propositional connectives ∧,∨,⊤,⊥, and modal operators i associated with
each agent i ∈ Ag. The formulas so generated do not denote states of affairs (to which a truth-value can
be assigned), but categories or concepts. In this modal language, as usual, it is easy to distinguish the
‘objective’ or factual information (stored in the database), encoded in the formulas of the modal-free frag-
ment of the language, and the agents’ subjective interpretation of the ‘objective’ information, encoded
in formulas in which modal operators occur. In this language, we can talk about e.g. the category that
according to Alice is the category that according to Bob is the category of Western movies. This makes
it possible to define fixed points of these regressions, similarly to the way in which common knowledge
is defined in classical epistemic logic [10]. Intuitively, these fixed points represent the stabilization of a
process of social interaction; for instance, the consensus reached by a group of agents regarding a given
category.
Models for this logic are formal contexts (A,X , I) enriched with an extra relation Ri ⊆ A×X for each
agent (intuitively, for every object a ∈ A and every feature x ∈ X , we read aRix as ‘object a has feature
x according to agent i’. Hence, while the relation I represents reality as is recorded in the database
represented by the formal context (A,X , I), each relation Ri represents as usual the subjective view of the
corresponding agent i about objects and their features, and is used to interpret i-formulas.
This logic arises and has been studied in the context of unified correspondence theory [5], and allows
one to relate, via Sahlqvist-type results, sentences in the first-order language of enriched formal contexts
(expressing low-level, concrete conditions about objects and features) with inequalities ϕ ≤ ψ , where
ϕ and ψ are formulas in the modal language above, expressing high-level, abstract relations about cate-
gories and how they are perceived and understood by different agents. In the next section, we expand on
the relevant definitions and background facts about this logic.
3 Epistemic logic of categories
Basic logic and intended meaning. Let Prop be a (countable or finite) set of atomic propositions and
Ag be a finite set (of agents). The basic language L of the epistemic logic of categories is
ϕ :=⊥ | ⊤ | p | ϕ ∧ϕ | ϕ ∨ϕ |iϕ ,
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where p ∈ Prop. As mentioned above, formulas in this language are terms denoting categories (or
concepts). Atomic propositions provide a vocabulary of category labels, such as music genres (e.g. jazz,
rock, rap), movie genres (e.g. western, drama, horror), supermarket products (e.g. milk, dairy products,
fresh herbs). Compound formulas ϕ ∧ϕ and ϕ∨ψ respectively denote the greatest common subcategory
and the smallest common supercategory of ϕ and ψ . For a given agent i ∈ Ag, the formula iϕ denotes
the category ϕ , according to i. At this stage we are deliberately vague as to the precise meaning of
‘according to’. Depending on the properties ofi, the formula iϕ might denote the category known, or
perceived, or believed to be ϕ by agent i. The basic, or minimal normal L -logic is a set L of sequents
ϕ ⊢ ψ (which intuitively read “ϕ is a subcategory of ψ”) with ϕ ,ψ ∈ L , containing the following
axioms:
• Sequents for propositional connectives:
p ⊢ p, ⊥ ⊢ p, p ⊢ ⊤,
p ⊢ p∨q, q ⊢ p∨q, p∧q ⊢ p, p∧q ⊢ q,
• Sequents for modal operators:
⊤ ⊢i⊤ ip∧iq ⊢i (p∧q)
and closed under the following inference rules:
ϕ ⊢ χ χ ⊢ ψ
ϕ ⊢ ψ
ϕ ⊢ ψ
ϕ (χ/p) ⊢ ψ (χ/p)
χ ⊢ ϕ χ ⊢ ψ
χ ⊢ ϕ ∧ψ
ϕ ⊢ χ ψ ⊢ χ
ϕ ∨ψ ⊢ χ
ϕ ⊢ ψ
iϕ ⊢iψ
Thus, the modal fragment of L incorporates the viewpoints of individual agents into the syllogistic rea-
soning supported by the propositional fragment of L. By an L -logic, we understand any extension of L
with L -axioms ϕ ⊢ ψ .
Interpretation in enriched formal contexts. Let us discuss the structures which play the role of
Kripke frames.2 An enriched formal context is a tuple
F= (P,{Ri | i ∈ Ag})
such that P= (A,X , I) is a formal context, and Ri ⊆ A×X for every i ∈ Ag, satisfying certain additional
properties which guarantee that their associated modal operators are well defined (cf. Definition 2). As
mentioned above, formal contexts represent databases of market products (the elements of the set A),
relevant features (the elements of the set X ), and an incidence relation I ⊆ A×X (so that aIx reads:
“market product a has feature x”). In addition, enriched formal contexts contain information about the
epistemic attitudes of individual agents, so that aRix reads: “market product a has feature x according
to agent i”, for any i ∈ Ag. A valuation on F is a map V : Prop→ P (A)×P (B), with the restriction
that V (p) is a formal concept of P= (A,X , I), i.e., every p ∈ Prop is mapped to V (p) = (B,Y ) such that
B ⊆ A, Y ⊆ X , and B×Y is maximal rectangle contained in I. For example, if p is the category-label
denoting western movies, and P is a given database of movies (stored in A) and movie-features (stored in
X ), then V interprets the category-label p in the modelM = (F,V ) as the formal concept (i.e. semantic
category) V (p) = (B,Y ), specified by the set of movies B (i.e. the set of western movies of the database)
2Details can be found in Section A.
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and by the set of movie-features Y (i.e. the set of features which all western movies have). The elements
of B are the members of category p inM; the elements ofY describe category p inM. The set B (resp. Y )
is the extension (resp. the description) of p inM, and sometimes we will denote it [[p]]M (resp. ([p])M) or
[[p]] (resp. ([p])) when it does not cause confusion. Alternatively, we write:
M,a p iff a ∈ [[p]]M
M,x≻ p iff x ∈ ([p])M
and we read M,a  p as “a is a member of p”, and M,x ≻ p as “x describes p”. The interpretation of
atomic propositions can be extended to propositional L -formulas as follows:
M,a ⊤ always
M,x≻⊤ iff aIx for all a ∈ A
M,x≻⊥ always
M,a ⊥ iff aIx for all x ∈ X
M,a  ϕ ∧ψ iff M,a  ϕ andM,a ψ
M,x≻ ϕ ∧ψ iff for all a ∈ A, ifM,a  ϕ ∧ψ , then aIx
M,x≻ ϕ ∨ψ iff M,x≻ ϕ andM,x≻ ψ
M,a  ϕ ∨ψ iff for all x ∈ X , ifM,x≻ ϕ ∨ψ , then aIx
Hence, in each model, ⊤ is interpreted as the category generated by the set A of all objects, i.e. the
widest category and hence the one with the laxest (possibly empty) description; ⊥ is interpreted as the
category generated by the set X of all features, i.e. the smallest (possibly empty) category and hence
the one with the most restrictive description; ϕ ∧ψ is interpreted as the semantic category generated
by the intersection of the extensions of ϕ and ψ (hence, the description of ϕ ∧ψ certainly includes
([ϕ ])∪ ([ψ ]) but is possibly larger). Likewise, ϕ ∨ψ is interpreted as the semantic category generated
by the intersection of the intensions of ϕ and ψ (hence, objects in [[ϕ ]]∪ [[ψ ]] are certainly members of
ϕ ∨ψ but there might be others). As to the interpretation of modal formulas:
M,a iϕ iff for all x ∈ X , ifM,x≻ ϕ , then aRix
M,x≻iϕ iff for all a ∈ A, ifM,a ϕ , then aIx.
Thus, in each model, iϕ is interpreted as the category whose members are those objects to which agent
i attributes every feature in the description of ϕ . Finally, as to the interpretation of sequents:
M |= ϕ ⊢ ψ iff for all a ∈ A, ifM,a  ϕ , thenM,a ψ .
Adding ‘common knowledge’. In [4], we observed that the environment described above is naturally
suited to capture not only the factual information and the epistemic attitudes of individual agents, but also
the outcome of social interaction. To this effect, we introduce an expansion LC of L with a common
knowledge-type operator C. Given Prop and Ag as above, the language LC of the epistemic logic of
categories with ‘common knowledge’ is:
ϕ :=⊥ | ⊤ | p | ϕ ∧ϕ | ϕ ∨ϕ |iϕ |C (ϕ) .
C-formulas are interpreted in models as follows:
M,a C (ϕ) iff for all x ∈ X , ifM,x≻ ϕ , then aRCx
M,x≻C (ϕ) iff for all a ∈ A, ifM,a C (ϕ), then aIx,
where RC ⊆ A×X is defined as RC =
⋂
s∈SRs, and Rs ⊆ A×X is the relation associated with the modal
operator s := i1 · · ·in for any element s = i1 · · · in in the set S of finite sequences of elements of Ag
(cf. Section A.2).
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The basic logic of categories with ‘common knowledge’ is a set LC of sequents ϕ ⊢ ψ , with ϕ ,ψ ∈
LC, which contains the axioms and is closed under the rules of L, and in addition contains the following
axioms:
⊤ ⊢C (⊤) C (p)∧C (q) ⊢C (p∧q) C (p) ⊢
∧
{ip∧iC (p) | i ∈ Ag}
and is closed under the following inference rules:
ϕ ⊢ ψ
C (ϕ) ⊢C (ψ)
χ ⊢
∧
i∈Agiϕ {χ ⊢iχ | i ∈ Ag}
χ ⊢C (ϕ)
Hybrid expansions of the basic language. In several settings, it is useful to be able to talk about
given objects (market-products) or given features. To this purpose, the languages L or LC can be
further enriched with dedicated sets of variables in the style of hybrid logic. Let Prop be a (countable
or finite) set of atomic propositions and Ag be a finite set (of agents). Given Prop and Ag as above, and
(countable or finite) sets Nom and Cnom (of nominals and conominals respectively), the language LH
of the hybrid logic of categories is:
ϕ :=⊥ | ⊤ | p | a | x | ϕ ∧ϕ | ϕ ∨ϕ |iϕ ,
where i ∈ Ag, p ∈ Prop, a ∈ Nom and x ∈ Cnom. A hybrid valuation on an enriched formal concept
F maps atomic propositions to formal concepts, nominal variables to the formal concepts generated by
single elements of the object domain A, and conominal variables to formal concepts generated by single
elements of the feature domain X . If V (a) is the semantic category generated by a ∈ A, and V (x) is the
semantic category generated by x ∈ X , then nominal and co-nominal variables are interpreted as follows:
M,y≻ a iff aIy,
M,b  a iff for all y ∈ X , if aIy then bIy
M,b  x iff bIx
M,y≻ x iff for all b ∈ A, if bIx then bIy.
4 Core concepts and proposed formalizations
In the present section, we use the languages L , LH and LC discussed in the previous section to capture
some core notions and properties about categories, appearing and used in the literature in management
science, which we discuss in the next subsection.
4.1 Core concepts
A core issue in management science is how to predict the success of a new market-product, or of a
given firm over its competitors. Success clearly depends on whether the agents in the relevant audiences
decide to buy the product or become clients of the firm, and a key factor in this decision is how each
agent resolves a categorization problem. The ease with which products or firms are categorized affects
in itself the decision-making, because the more difficult it is to categorize a product or a firm, the higher
the cognitive burden and the perceived risk of the decision. This is why research has focused on the
performances of category-spanning products or firms (i.e. products or firms which are members of more
than one category). While being a member of more than one category can increase visibility and aware-
ness, because audiences interested in any of these categories may pay attention to something which is
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also in that category, it usually lowers the success. However, the actual effects of spanning categories
will depend on the properties of the categories that are spanned. The core concepts of categorization
theory denote characteristics of categories or of the relation between categories that can be understood
to decrease or increase the effects of spanning categories with these particular characteristics.
Typicality. The issue of whether an object a is a typical member of a given category ϕ , or to which
extent a is typical of ϕ , is core to the similarity-based views of category-formation [26, 34, 36]. As
mentioned in Section 2.2, in conceptual spaces, the prototype of a formal concept is defined as the
geometric center of that concept, so that the closer (i.e. more similar) any other object is to the prototype,
the stronger its typicality. While this formalization is visually very appealing, it does not shed much light
on the role of the agents in establishing the typicality of an object relative to a category.
Distance. The distance between two categories can be defined in different ways. One approach [23]
is to express it as a negative exponential function of the categories’ similarity, where the categories’
similarity is calculated using a Jaccard index, i.e., cardinality of the intersection over cardinality of the
union. Another approach [33] is to take the Hausdorff distance between the sets in feature space that
correspond to the categories. The Hausdorff distance is the maximum of the two minimal point-to-set
distances.
Contrast. Contrast is defined as the extent to which a category stands out from other categories in the
same domain. It is a function of the mean typicality of objects in the category. In a high-contrast category,
objects tend to be either very typical members of the category or not members at all [18]. Objects in a
high-contrast category tend to be more recognizable to agents and more positively valued [30]. Category
spanning leads to greater penalties if the spanned categories have higher contrast [22].
Leniency. By definition of contrast, members of a low-contrast category ϕ have on average low typ-
icality in that category. This situation is compatible with each of the following alternatives: (a) there
are many categories which (according to agents) have members in common with ϕ , (b) there are not
many categories which (according to agents) have members in common with ϕ . The notion of leniency
clarifies this issue. The leniency of ϕ is defined as the extent to which the members of ϕ are (recognized
as) only members of ϕ (and of the other logically unavoidable categories), and not of other categories
[32].
4.2 Formalizations
The following proposals are not equivalent to the definitions discussed in the previous subsection, but try
to capture their purely qualitative content.
Typicality. The interpretation of C-formulas on models indicates that, for every category ϕ , the mem-
bers of C(ϕ) are those objects which are members of ϕ according to every agent, and moreover, ac-
cording to every agent, are attributed membership in ϕ by every (other) agent, and so on. This provides
justification for our proposal to regard the members of C(ϕ) as the (proto)typical members of ϕ . The
main feature of this proposal is that it is explicitly based on the agents’ viewpoints. This feature is com-
patible with empirical methodologies adopted to establish graded membership (cf. [19]). Notice that
there is a hierarchy of reasons why a given object fails to be a typical member of ϕ , the most severe
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being that some agents do not recognize its membership in ϕ , followed by some agents not recognizing
that any other agent would recognize it as a member of ϕ , and so on. This observation provides a purely
qualitative route to encode the gradedness of (the recognition of) category-membership. That is, two
non-typical objects3 a and b can be compared in terms of the minimum number of ‘epistemic iterations’
needed for their typicality test to fail, so that b is more atypical than a if fewer rounds are needed for b
than for a. This definition can be readily adapted so as to say that b is a more atypical member of ψ than
a is of ϕ .
Distance. For four categories ϕ ,ψ ,χ ,ξ , we can say that ϕ is closer to ψ than χ is to ξ by means of the
sequent ϕ∨ψ ⊢ ξ ∨χ , the sequent ξ ∧χ ⊢ϕ∧ψ , or by requiring the two sequents to hold simultaneously.
The first sequent says that ϕ and ψ have more features in common than ξ and χ have; the second sequent
says that ϕ and ψ have more common members than ξ and χ have. Notice that neither the first sequent
implies or is implied by the second. This is why it might be useful to consider the information encoded
in both sequents. When instantiated to ϕ = ξ , these conditions can be used to express that ϕ is closer to
ψ than to χ .
Contrast. If ϕ ⊢ C(ϕ) holds for a category ϕ , every member of ϕ is a typical member of ϕ , in the
sense discussed above, and hence ϕ has maximal contrast. Using the formalizations of typicality and
distance discussed above, we say that ϕ has equal or higher contrast than ψ if ϕ is closer to C(ϕ) than
ψ is to C(ψ).4
Leniency. A category ϕ has no leniency if its members do not simultaneously belong to other cate-
gories. This property can be captured by the following condition: for any ψ and χ , if ψ ⊢ ϕ and ψ ⊢ χ ,
then either ϕ ⊢ χ or χ ⊢ ϕ . To understand this condition, let us instantiate ψ as the nominal category a
(the category generated by one object). Then a ⊢ ϕ expresses that the generator of a is a member of ϕ .
The no-leniency of ϕ would require the generator a of a to not belong to other categories. However, the
nature of the present formalization constrains a to be a member of every χ such that ϕ ⊢ χ , so a must
belong to these categories at least. Also, all the categories χ such that a ⊢ χ ⊢ ϕ cannot be excluded
either, since the possibility that ‘in-between’ categories exist does not depend purely on a and ϕ alone,
but depends on the context of other objects and features. Hence, we can understand no-leniency as the
requirement that no other categories have a as a member than those of this minimal set of categories
which cannot be excluded.
For two categories ϕ and ψ , we say that ϕ has greater or equal leniency than ψ if, for every nominal
a, if a ⊢ ψ and a ⊢ χ for some χ such that χ 0 ψ and ψ 0 χ , then a ⊢ ϕ and moreover, a ⊢ ξ for some
category ξ such that ξ 0 ϕ and ϕ 0 ξ . Variants of these conditions can be given also in terms of the
features (using conominal variables), and also in terms of the modal operators.
5 Conclusions and further directions
In this paper, we have introduced a basic epistemic logic of categories, expanded it with ‘common
knowledge’-type and ‘hybrid logic’-type constructs, and used the resulting framework to capture core
3represented in the language LH as nominal variables.
4That is, by either requiring that ϕ ∨C(ϕ) ⊢ ψ ∨C(ψ), or by requiring that ψ ∨C(ψ) ⊢ ϕ ∨C(ϕ), or by requiring both
sequents to hold.
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notions in categorization theory, as developed in management science. The logical formalizations pro-
posed in Section 4.2 try to capture the purely qualitative content of the original definitions. The essential
features of this logical framework make it particularly suitable to emphasize the different perspectives
of individual agents, and how these perspectives interact. The propositional base of these logics is the
positive (i.e. negation-free and implication-free) fragment of classical propositional logic (without dis-
tributivity laws). The Kripke-style semantics of this logic is given by structures known as formal contexts
in Formal Concept Analysis [14], which we have enriched with binary relations to account for the (epis-
temic) interpretation of the modal operators. One fundamental difference between this semantics and
the classical Kripke semantics for epistemic logics is that the relations directly encode the actual view-
point of the individual agents, and not their uncertainty or ignorance (aRix reads ‘object a has feature x
according to agent i).
This paper is still very much a first step, but it already shows how logic can contribute to the vast
interdisciplinary area of categorization theory, especially with regard to the analysis of various types of
social interaction (e.g. epistemic, dynamic, strategic). Interestingly, the prospective contributions involve
both technical aspects (some of which we discuss below) and conceptual aspects (since, as discussed in
Section 2, there is no single foundational theory or view which exhaustively accounts for all the relevant
aspects of categorization).
From RS-frames to arbitrary contexts. The present paper refines previous work [4], which provides
a conceptually independent explanation of the (rather technical) definition of the interpretation clauses
of L -formulas on certain enriched formal contexts. These clauses were obtainable as the outcome of
mechanical computations (cf. [6, Section 2.1.1], [4, Section A]) the soundness of which was guaranteed
by certain facts pertaining to the duality for perfect lattices (cf. [9, 16]). The treatment in Section 3
adapts these interpretation clauses to the more general and intuitively more natural category of arbitrary
(enriched) formal contexts and their morphisms [28].
Fixed points. One of the most interesting aspects of the present proposal is that typicality has been
captured with a ‘common knowledge’ operator. This operator is semantically equivalent to the usual
greatest fixed point construction (cf. Section A). This paves the way to the use of languages expanded
with fixed point operators to capture: for instance, as discussed in [3, Example 4], the formula νX .i(X∧
p) denotes the category obtained as the limit of a process of “introspection” (in which the agent reflects
on her perception of a given category p, and on her perception of her perception, and so on). A systematic
exploration of this direction is work in progress.
Proof calculi. The present framework makes it possible to blend together syllogistic and epistemic
reasoning. To further explore those aspects connected with reasoning and deduction in L and LC, specif-
ically designed proof calculi will be needed. These calculi will be useful tools to explore the computa-
tional properties of these logics; moreover, the conclusions of formal inferences can provide the basis
for the development of testable hypotheses. A proof-theoretic account of the basic logic L can be readily
achieved by augmenting the calculus developed in [17] for the propositional base with suitable rules for
the modal operators, so as to fall into the general theory of [12]. However, the proof theory of LC needs
to be investigated. The omega rules introduced in [13] might provide a template.
Dynamic epistemic logic of categories. An adequate formal account of the dynamic nature of cate-
gories is a core challenge facing modern categorization theory. Categories are cognitive tools that agents
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use as long as they are useful, which is why some categories have existed for millennia and others quickly
fade away. Categories shape and are shaped by social interaction. This bidirectional causality is essen-
tial to what categories are and do, and this is why the most important and challenging further direction
concerns how categories impact on social interaction and how social interaction changes agents’ catego-
rizations. One natural step in this direction is to expand the present framework with dynamic modalities,
and extend the construction of dynamic updates to models based on enriched formal contexts, as done
e.g. in [27, 25].
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A Soundness and completeness
In Section A.1, we define I-compatible relations and give their properties. In Section A.2, we prove that
composition of I compatible relations is associative and that the interpretation of C is well-defined. In
Section A.3, we prove the soundness of the axioms given in Section 3. In Section A.4, we prove the
week completeness of the logics L and LC defined in Section 3.
A.1 I-compatible relations
In what follows, we fix two sets A and X , and use a,b (resp. x,y) for elements of A (resp. X ), and B,C,A j
(resp. Y,W,X j) for subsets of A (resp. of X ) throughout this section. For any relation S ⊆ A×X , let
S↑[B] := {x | ∀a(a ∈ B⇒ aSx)} S↓[Y ] := {a | ∀x(x ∈ Y ⇒ aSx)}.
Well known properties of this construction (cf. [8, Sections 7.22-7.29]) are stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. 1. B⊆C implies S↑[C]⊆ S↑[B], and Y ⊆W implies S↓[W ]⊆ S↓[Y ].
2. B⊆ S↓[S↑[B]] and Y ⊆ S↑[S↓[Y ]].
3. S↑[B] = S↑[S↓[S↑[B]]] and S↓[Y ] = S↓[S↑[S↓[Y ]]].
4. S↓[
⋃
Y ] =
⋂
Y∈Y S
↓[Y ] and S↑[
⋃
B] =
⋂
B∈B S
↑[B].
For any formal context P = (A,X , I), we sometimes use B↑ for I↑[B], and Y ↓ for I↓[Y ], and say that
B (resp. Y ) is Galois-stable if B = B↑↓ (resp. Y = Y ↓↑). When B = {a} (resp. Y = {x}) we write a↑↓
for {a}↑↓ (resp. x↓↑ for {x}↓↑). Galois-stable sets are the projections of some maximal rectangle (formal
concept) of P. The following lemma collects more well known facts (cf. [8, Sections 7.22-7.29]):
Lemma 2. 1. B↑ and Y ↓ are Galois-stable.
2. B=
⋃
a∈B a
↑↓ and Y =
⋃
y∈Y y
↓↑ for any Galois-stable B and Y .
3. Galois-stable sets are closed under arbitrary intersections.
Proof. For item 2, since a↑↓ ⊇ {a}, we have that B ⊆
⋃
a∈B a
↑↓. For the other direction, if {a} ⊆ B then
a↑↓ ⊆ B↑↓. Since B is Galois-stable, we have that B= B↑↓. Hence a↑↓ ⊆ B for any a ∈ B, which implies
that
⋃
a∈B a
↑↓ ⊆ B. The proof for Y is analogous.
Definition 1. For any P = (A,X , I), any R ⊆ A×X is I-compatible if R↓[x] and R↑[a] are Galois-stable
for all x and a.
By Lemma 1 (3), I is an I-compatible relation.
Lemma 3. If R⊆ A×X is I-compatible, then R↓[Y ] = R↓[Y ↓↑] and R↑[B] = R↑[B↑↓].
Proof. By Lemma 1 (2), we have Y ⊆ Y ↓↑, which implies R↓[Y ↓↑]⊆ R↓[Y ] by Lemma 1 (1). Conversely,
if a∈R↓[Y ], i.e.Y ⊆ R↑[a], thenY ↓↑⊆ (R↑[a])↓↑ = R↑[a], the last identity holding since R is I-compatible.
Hence, a ∈ R↓[Y ↓↑], as required. The proof of the second identity is similar.
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Lemma 4. If R is I-compatible and Y is Galois-stable, then R↓[Y ] is Galois-stable.
Proof. Since Y =
⋃
y∈Y{y}, by Lemma 1 (4),
R↓[Y ] = R↓[
⋃
y∈Y
{y}] =
⋂
y∈Y
R↓[{y}] =
⋂
y∈Y
R↓[y]. (1)
By the I-compatibility of R, the last term is an intersection of Galois-stable sets, which is Galois-stable
(cf. Lemma 2 (3)).
The lemma above ensures that the interpretation of L -formulas on enriched formal contexts defines
a compositional semantics on formal concepts if the relations Ri are I-compatible. Indeed, for every
enriched formal context F= (P,{Ri | i ∈ Ag}), every valuation V on F extends to an interpretation map
of L -formulas defined as follows:
V (p) = ([[p]],([p])) V (ϕ ∧ψ) = ([[ϕ ]]∩ [[ψ ]],([[ϕ ]]∩ [[ψ ]])↑)
V (⊤) = (A,A↑) V (ϕ ∨ψ) = ((([ϕ ])∩ ([ψ ]))↓,([ϕ ])∩ ([ψ ]))
V (⊥) = (X↓,X) V (iϕ) = (R
↓
i [([ϕ ])],(R
↓
i [([ϕ ])])
↑)
By Lemma 4, if V (ϕ) is a formal concept, then so is V (iϕ).
Definition 2. An enriched formal context F = (P,{Ri | i ∈ Ag}) is compositional if Ri is I-compatible
(cf. Definition 1) for every i ∈ Ag. A modelM= (F,V ) is compositional if so is F.
A.2 The interpretation ofC is well defined
For any formal context P = (A,X , I) the I-product of the relations Rs,Rt ⊆ A×X is the relation Rst ⊆
A×X defined as follows:
a ∈ R↓st [x] iff a ∈ R
↓
s
[
I↑
[
R
↓
t [x
↓↑]
]]
.
Lemma 5. If Rs and Rt are I-compatible, then Rst is I-compatible.
Proof. R
↓
st [x] being Galois-stable follows from the definition of Rst , Lemma 4, and the I-compatibility of
Rs and Rt . To show that R
↑
st [a] is Galois-stable, i.e. (R
↑
st [a])
↓↑ ⊆ R↑st [a], by Lemma 2 (2), it is enough to
show that if y ∈ R↑st [a] then y
↓↑ ⊆ R↑st [a]. Let y ∈ R
↑
st [a], i.e. a ∈ R
↓
st [y] = R
↓
s
[
I↑
[
R
↓
t [y
↓↑]
]]
. If x ∈ y↓↑, then
x↓↑ ⊆ y↓↑, which implies, by the antitonicity of R↓s , I↑ and R
↓
t (cf. Lemma 1 (1)), that R
↓
s
[
I↑
[
R
↓
t [y
↓↑]
]]
⊆
R
↓
s
[
I↑
[
R
↓
t [x
↓↑]
]]
. Hence, a ∈ R↓st [x], i.e. x ∈ R
↑
st [a], as required.
The definition of I-product serves to characterize semantically the relation associated with the modal
operators s :=i1 · · ·in for any finite nonempty sequence s := i1 · · · in ∈ S of elements of Ag, in terms
of the relations associated with each primitive modal operator. For any such s, let Rs be defined recur-
sively as follows:
• If s= i, then Rs = Ri;
• If s= it, then R↓s [x] = R
↓
i
[
I↑
[
R
↓
t
[
x↓↑
]]]
.
Lemma 5 immediately implies that
Corollary 1. For every s ∈ S, the relation Rs is I-compatible.
Lemma 6. If Y is Galois-stable and Rs,Rt are I-compatible, then R
↓
st [Y ] = R
↓
s [I
↑[R↓t [Y ]]].
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Proof.
R
↓
s [I
↑[R↓t [Y ]]] = R
↓
s [I
↑[R↓t [
⋃
x∈Y x
↓↑]]] Lemma 2 (2)
= R
↓
s [I
↑[
⋂
x∈Y R
↓
t [x
↓↑]]] Lemma 1 (4)
= R
↓
s [I↑[
⋂
x∈Y I
↓[I↑[R↓t [x
↓↑]]]]] R↓t [x
↓↑] Galois-stable
= R
↓
s [I
↑[I↓[
⋃
x∈Y I
↑[R↓t [x
↓↑]]]]] Lemma 1 (4)
= R
↓
s [
⋃
x∈Y I
↑[R↓t [x
↓↑]]] Lemma 3
=
⋂
x∈Y R
↓
s [I↑[R
↓
t [x
↓↑]]] Lemma 1 (4)
=
⋂
x∈Y R
↓
st [x] Definition of Rst
= R
↓
st [
⋃
x∈Y x] Lemma 1 (4)
= R
↓
st [Y ] Y =
⋃
x∈Y x
Lemma 7. If Rs,Rt ,Rw are I-compatible, Rs(tw) = R(st)w.
Proof. for any x,
R
↓
s(tw)[x] = R
↓
s [I
↑[R↓tw[x
↓↑]]] definition of I-product
= R
↓
s [I
↑[R↓t [I
↑[R↓w[x
↓↑]]]]] Lemma 6
= R
↓
st [I
↑[R↓w[x↓↑]]]. Lemma 6
= R
↓
(st)w[x] definition of I-product
Let s= i1 · · · in ∈ S, and let s :=i1 · · ·in .
Lemma 8. For any modelM= (F,V ),
M,a sϕ iff for all x ∈ X, ifM,x≻ ϕ , then aRsx
M,x≻sϕ iff for all a ∈ A, ifM,a sϕ , then aIx.
Proof. By induction on the length of s. The base case is immediate. Let s = it. Then [[itϕ]] =
R
↓
i [([tϕ])] = R
↓
i [I
↑[[[tϕ]]]] = R
↓
i [I
↑[R↓t [([ϕ ])]]] = R
↓
s [([ϕ ])]. The last equality holds by Lemma 6. The
second equivalence is trivially true.
Lemma 9. For any family R of I-compatible relations,
1.
⋂
R is an I-compatible relation.
2. (
⋂
R)↓[Y ] =
⋂
T∈R T
↓[Y ] for any Y ⊆ X.
Proof. Let R =
⋂
R. Then R↓[x] =
⋂
T∈R T
↓[x] and R↑[a] =
⋂
T∈R T
↑[a]. Then the statement follows
from Lemma 2 (3). As to item (2),
⋂
T∈R T
↓[Y ] =
⋂
T∈R T
↓[
⋃
y∈Y y] Y =
⋃
y∈Y y
=
⋂
T∈R
⋂
y∈Y T
↓[y] Lemma 1 (4)
=
⋂
y∈Y
⋂
T∈R T
↓[y] associativity, commutativity of
⋂
=
⋂
y∈Y (
⋂
R)↓[y] definition of (·)↓
= (
⋂
R)↓[
⋃
y∈Y y] Lemma 1 (4)
= (
⋂
R)↓[Y ]. Y =
⋃
y∈Y y
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The lemmas above ensure that, in enriched formal contexts in which the relations Ri are I-compatible,
the relation RC :=
⋂
s∈SRs is I-compatible, and hence the interpretation of LC-formulas on the model
based on these enriched formal contexts defines a compositional semantics on formal concepts. Indeed,
for every such enriched formal context F = (P,{Ri | i ∈ Ag}), every valuation V on F extends to an
interpretation map of C-formulas as follows:
V (C(ϕ)) = (R↓C[([ϕ ])],(R
↓
C[([ϕ ])])
↑)
so that if V (ϕ) is a formal concept, then so is V (iϕ). Moreover, the following identity is semantically
supported:
C(ϕ) =
∧
s∈S
sϕ ,
where s := i1 · · · in is any finite nonempty string of elements of Ag, and s :=i1 · · ·in .
A.3 Soundness
Proposition 1. For any compositional modelM and any i ∈ Ag,
1. ifM |= ϕ ⊢ ψ , thenM |=iϕ ⊢iψ;
2. M |=⊤ ⊢i⊤;
3. M |=iϕ ∧iψ ⊢i(ϕ ∧ψ).
Proof. By Lemma 1 (1), if [[ϕ ]]⊆ [[ψ ]] then
[[iϕ]] = R
↓
i [I
↑[[[ϕ ]]]]⊆ R↓i [I
↑[[[ψ ]]]] = [[iψ ]],
which proves item (1). As to item (2), it is enough to show that [[i⊤]] = A. By definition, [[i⊤]] =
R
↓
i [([⊤])] =R
↓
i [A
↑], hence it is enough to show that R↓i [A
↑] =A. The assumption of I-compatibility implies
that R
↑
i [a] is Galois-stable for every a∈A, and hence A
↑⊆ R↑i [a]. Thus by adjunction a∈R
↓
i [A
↑] for every
a ∈ A, which implies that R↓i [A
↑] = A, as required. As to item (3),
[[(ϕ)∧(ψ)]] = R↓[([ϕ ])]∩R↓[([ψ ])] definition of [[·]]
= R↓[([ϕ ])∪ ([ψ ])] Lemma 1 (4)
= R↓[I↑[I↓[([ϕ ])∪ ([ψ ])]]] Lemma 3
= R↓[I↑[I↓[([ϕ ])]∩ I↓[([ψ ])]]] Lemma 1 (4)
= R↓[I↑[[[ϕ ]]∩ [[ψ ]]]] V (ϕ),V (ϕ) formal concepts
= R↓[I↑[[[ϕ ∧ψ ]]]] definition of [[·]]
= [[(ϕ ∧ψ)]]. definition of [[·]]
Proposition 2. For any compositional modelM,
1. M |=C(ϕ) ⊢
∧
{iϕ ∧iC(ϕ) | i ∈ Ag};
2. ifM |= χ ⊢
∧
i∈Agiϕ andM |= χ ⊢
∧
i∈Agiχ , thenM |= χ ⊢C(ϕ).
Proof. By definition and Lemma 9 (2), [[C(ϕ)]] = R↓C[([ϕ ])] =
⋂
s∈SR
↓
s [([ϕ ])] ⊆
⋂
i∈AgR
↓
i [([ϕ ])], which
proves M |=C(ϕ) ⊢
∧
{iϕ | i ∈ Ag}. Let i ∈ Ag. The following chain of (in)equalities completes the
proof of item (1):
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[[iC(ϕ)]] = R
↓
i [I
↑[R↓C[([ϕ ])]]] definition of [[·]]
= R
↓
i [I
↑[
⋂
s∈SR
↓
s [([ϕ ])]]] Lemma 9 (2)
= R
↓
i [I
↑[
⋂
s∈S I
↓[I↑[R↓s [([ϕ ])]]]]] R
↓
s [([ϕ ])] Galois-stable
= R
↓
i [I
↑[I↓[
⋃
s∈S I
↑[R↓s [([ϕ ])]]]]] Lemma 1 (4)
= R
↓
i [
⋃
s∈S I
↑[R↓s [([ϕ ])]]] Lemma 3
=
⋂
s∈SR
↓
i [I
↑[R↓s [([ϕ ])]]] Lemma 1 (4)
=
⋂
s∈SR
↓
is[([ϕ ])] Lemma 6
⊇
⋂
s∈SR
↓
s [([ϕ ])] {is | s ∈ S} ⊆ S
= [[C(ϕ)]]. Lemma 9 (2)
As to item (2), using Proposition 1 (1) and the assumptions, one can show thatM |= χ ⊢sϕ for every
s ∈ S. Hence, [[χ ]]⊆
⋂
s∈SR
↓
s [([ϕ ])] = R
↓
C[([ϕ ])] = [[C(ϕ)]], as required.
A.4 Completeness
The completeness of L can be proven via a standard canonical model construction. For any lattice L
with normal operators i, let FL = (PL,{Ri | i ∈ Ag}) be defined as follows: PL = (A,X , I) where A
(resp. X ) is the set of lattice filters (resp. ideals) of L, and aIx iff a∩ x 6= ∅. For every i ∈ Ag, let
Ri ⊆ A×X be defined by aRix iff if iu ∈ a for some u ∈ L such that u ∈ x. In what follows, for any
a ∈ A and x ∈ X , we let ix := {iu ∈ L | u ∈ x} and 
−1
i a := {u ∈ L |iu ∈ a}. Hence by definition,
R
↓
i [x] = {a | a∩ix 6=∅} for any x ∈ X , and R
↑
i [a] = {x | x∩
−1
i a 6=∅} for any a ∈ A. Notice also that
i⊤=⊤ implies that 
−1
i a= 6=∅ for every a ∈ A.
Lemma 10. For FL as above, and any a ∈ A, x ∈ X and i ∈ Ag,
1. I↑[R↓i [x]] = {y ∈ X |ix⊆ y};
2. I↓[Ri[a]] = {b ∈ A |
−1
i a⊆ b};
3. I↓[I↑[R↓i [x]]] = {b ∈ A |ix∩b 6=∅}= R
↓
i [x];
4. I↑[I↓[R↑i [a]]] = {y ∈ X |
−1
i a∩ y 6=∅}= R
↑
i [a].
Proof. Items (1) and (2) immediately follow from the definitions of ix and 
−1
i a. As to items (3)
and (4), from the previous items it immediately follows that I↓[I↑[R↓i [x]]] = {b ∈ A | ⌈ix⌉ ∩ b 6= ∅}
and I↑[I↓[R↑i [a]]] = {y ∈ X | ⌊
−1
i a⌋ ∩ y 6= ∅}, where ⌈ix⌉ and ⌊
−1
i a⌋ respectively denote the ideal
generated ix and the filter generated by 
−1
i a. Then, using the monotonicity of i, one can show that
{b ∈ A | ⌈ix⌉∩ b 6= ∅} = {b ∈ A | ix∩ b 6= ∅} = R
↓
i [x], and using the meet preservation of i, one
can show that {y ∈ X | ⌊−1i a⌋∩ y 6=∅}= {y ∈ X |
−1
i a∩ y 6=∅}= R
↑
i [a], as required. Notice that the
last equality holds for every a ∈ A under the assumption that −1i a 6= ∅, which, as remarked above, is
guaranteed by i being normal.
Items (3) and (4) of the lemma above immediately imply that:
Lemma 11. FL is a compositional enriched formal context (cf. Definition 2).
Recall that S is the set of nonempty finite sequences of elements of Ag.
Lemma 12. If x is the ideal generated by some u ∈ L, then, for every s ∈ S, R↓s [x] = {a |su ∈ a}.
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Proof. By induction on the length of s ∈ S. If s = i then aRix iff a ∈ R
↓
i [x] iff a∩ix 6= ∅. Since
x is the ideal generated by u, we have that u is the greatest element of x; hence, the monotonicity of
i implies that iu is the greatest element of ix. Since a is a filter, and hence is upward-closed,
a∩ix 6= ∅ is equivalent to iu ∈ a, which completes the proof of the base case. Let us assume that
R
↓
s [x] = {b ∈ A | su ∈ b}, and show that R
↓
is[x] = {b ∈ A | isu ∈ b}. By Lemma 10 (3) and (4), and
Lemma 5, Rs is I-compatible for every s ∈ S. Let z be the ideal generated by su. Hence:
R
↓
is[x] = R
↓
i [I
↑[R↓s [x]]] Lemmas 3 and 6
= R
↓
i [({b ∈ A |su ∈ b})
↑] induction hypothesis
= R
↓
i [{y ∈ X |su ∈ y}] (∗)
= R
↓
i [z] definition of z
= {a |isu ∈ a} base case
= {a |isu ∈ a}. definition of is
The identity marked with (∗) follows from the fact that the filter generated bysu is the smallest element
of R
↓
s [x].
The canonical enriched formal context is defined by instantiating the construction above to the
Lindembaum-Tarski algebra of L. In this case, let V be the valuation such that [[p]] (resp. ([p])) is the
set of the filters (resp. ideals) to which p belongs, and letM= (FL,V ) be the canonical model. Then the
following holds forM:
Lemma 13 (Truth lemma). For every ϕ ∈L ,
1. M,a ϕ iff ϕ ∈ a;
2. M,x≻ ϕ iff ϕ ∈ x.
Proof. By induction on ϕ . We only show the inductive step for ϕ := iσ .
M,a iσ iff a ∈ R
↓
i [([σ ])]
iff a ∈ R↓i [{x | σ ∈ x}] induction hypothesis
iff a ∈ {b ∈ A |iσ ∈ b} definition of Ri
iff iσ ∈ a.
M,x≻iσ iff x ∈ ([iσ ])
iff x ∈ [[iσ ]]
↑
iff x ∈ {a ∈ A |iσ ∈ a}
↑ proof above
iff iσ ∈ x.
The weak completeness of L follows from the lemma above with the usual argument.
Proposition 3 (Completeness). If ϕ ⊢ ψ is an L -sequent which is not derivable in L, thenM 6|= ϕ ⊢ ψ .
The weak completeness for LC is proved along the lines of [10, Theorem 3.3.1]. Namely, for any LC-
sequent ϕ ⊢ψ that is not derivable in LC, we will construct a finite modelMϕ ,ψ such thatMϕ ,ψ 6|= ϕ ⊢ψ .
Let Φ0 be the set the elements of which are ⊤, ⊥ and all the subformulas of ϕ and ψ . Let
Φ1 := Φ0∪
⋃
i∈Ag
{iσ | σ ∈ Φ0} and Φ := {
∧
Ψ |Ψ ⊆ Φ1}.
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By construction, Φ is finite. Consider the canonical model M defined above, and the following equiva-
lence relations on A and X :
a≡Φ b iff a∩Φ = b∩Φ and x≡Φ y iff x∩Φ = y∩Φ.
Since Φ is finite, these equivalence relations induce finitely many equivalence classes on A and X . In
particular, considering ⊢ as a preorder on Φ, each element a of A/≡Φ is uniquely identified by some Φ-
filter, i.e. a ⊢-upward closed subset of Φ which is also closed under existing conjunctions. Analogously,
each x ∈ X/≡Φ is uniquely identified by some Φ-ideal, i.e. a ⊢-downward closed subset of Φ which
is also closed under existing disjunctions. In addition, since Φ is closed under conjunctions, the Φ-
filter corresponding to each a is principal, i.e. for each a ∈ A/≡Φ some τa ∈ Φ exists such that a can be
identified with the set of the formulas σ ∈Φ such that τa ⊢ σ is an LC-derivable sequent. In what follows,
we abuse notation and let a and x respectively denote the principal Φ-filter and the Φ-ideal with which a
and x can be identified, as discussed above. With this convention, we can write∗i x := {iσ | σ ∈ x}∩Φ
and (−1i )
∗a := {τ ∈Φ |iτ ∈ a}. As a consequence of ⊥,⊤∈Φ0 and i⊤=⊤ we have that 
∗
i x and
(−1i )
∗a are always non-empty. Let us define:
Mϕ ,ψ = (A/≡Φ,X/≡Φ, Iϕ ,ψ ,R
ϕ ,ψ
i ,Vϕ ,ψ),
where
aIϕ ,ψx iff a∩ x 6=∅ iff τa ∈ x
aR
ϕ ,ψ
i x iff 
∗
i x∩a 6=∅
iff τa ⊢iτ is LC-derivable for some τ ∈ x,
and Vϕ ,ψ is any valuation such that [[p]] = {a | p ∈ a} and ([p]) = {x | p ∈ x} for all p ∈ Prop∩Φ. In
what follows, we often abbreviate Iϕ ,ψ as I. It readily follows from the definition that [[p]]
↑↓ = [[p]] and
([p])↓↑ = ([p]) for any p ∈ Prop∩Φ; moreover, (R
ϕ ,ψ
i )
↓[x] = {a | a∩∗i x 6= ∅}, and (R
ϕ ,ψ
i )
↑[a] = {x |
x∩ (−1i )
∗a 6=∅}. From this, similarly to Lemma 10, it immediately follows that:
Lemma 14. For any a, x and i ∈ Ag,
1. I
↑
ϕ ,ψ [(R
ϕ ,ψ
i )
↓[x]] = {y |∗i x⊆ y};
2. I
↓
ϕ ,ψ [(R
ϕ ,ψ
i )
↑[a]] = {b ∈ A | (−1i )
∗a⊆ b};
3. I
↓
ϕ ,ψ [I
↑
ϕ ,ψ [(R
ϕ ,ψ
i )
↓[x]]] = {b |∗i x∩b 6=∅}= (R
ϕ ,ψ
i )
↓[x];
4. I
↑
ϕ ,ψ [I
↓
ϕ ,ψ [(R
ϕ ,ψ
i )
↑[a]]] = {y | (−1i )
∗a∩ y 6=∅}= R↑i [a].
Items (3) and (4) of the lemma above immediately imply that:
Lemma 15. R
ϕ ,ψ
i is Iϕ ,ψ -compatible for any i ∈ Ag.
The following is key to the proof of the Truth Lemma.
Lemma 16. If C(σ) ∈ Φ, then the following is an LC-derivable sequent for any i ∈ Ag:
∨
a∈[[C(σ)]]
τa ⊢ i(
∨
a∈[[C(σ)]]
τa).
Proof. Fix i ∈ Ag and a ∈ [[C(σ)]]. Since i is monotone, it is enough to show that some τ ∈ Φ exists
such that
τa ⊢ iτ and τ ⊢
∨
a∈[[C(σ)]]
τa.
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By definition of R
ϕ ,ψ
i , this is equivalent to showing that aR
ϕ ,ψ
i y, where y is the Φ-ideal generated by∨
a∈[[C(σ)]] τa. Notice that ([C(σ)]) = [[C(σ)]]
↑ is the collection of all the Φ-ideals x such that τb ∈ x for
every b ∈ [[C(σ)]]. Hence, y ∈ ([C(σ)]) (and is in fact the smallest element in ([C(σ)])). Thus, to prove
that aR
ϕ ,ψ
i y, it is enough to show that [[C(σ)]] ⊆ (R
ϕ ,ψ
s )↓[([C(σ)])]. This immediately follows from the
fact that (R
ϕ ,ψ
s )↓[([C(σ)])] = [[iC(σ)]], thatC(σ) ⊢iC(σ) is an LC-derivable sequent, that LC is sound
w.r.t. compositional models (cf. Proposition 2), andMϕ ,ψ is a compositional model (cf. Lemma 15).
Lemma 17 (Truth lemma). For every τ ∈Φ0,
1. Mϕ ,ψ ,a  τ iff τ ∈ a;
2. Mϕ ,ψ ,x≻ τ iff τ ∈ x.
Proof. We only show the inductive step for τ := C(σ) for some σ ∈ Φ0. If Mϕ ,ψ ,a  C(σ), i.e. a ∈
[[C(σ)]] =
⋂
s∈S(R
ϕ ,ψ
s )↓[([σ ])], then a ∈ (R
ϕ ,ψ
i )
↓[([σ ])] = [[iσ ]] for any i ∈ Ag. By definition, σ ∈ Φ0
implies that iσ ∈ Φ. Moreover:
a ∈ [[iσ ]] iff a ∈ (R
ϕ ,ψ
i )
↓[([σ ])]
iff a ∈ (R
ϕ ,ψ
i )
↓[{x | σ ∈ x}] induction hypothesis
iff a ∈ {b |iσ ∈ b} definition of R
ϕ ,ψ
i
iff iσ ∈ a.
This implies that τa ⊢
∧
i∈Agiσ . By Lemma 16 and the fact that LC is closed under the following rule:
χ ⊢
∧
i∈Agiϕ {χ ⊢iχ | i ∈ Ag}
χ ⊢C (ϕ)
we conclude that τa ⊢C(σ), i.e. C(σ) ∈ a.
For the converse direction, let b be the principal Φ-filter generated byC(σ). Let us show, by induction
on the length of s, that b ∈ (R
ϕ ,ψ
s )
↓[([σ ])] for all s ∈ S. Indeed, for the base case, iσ ∈ Φ and C(σ) ⊢
iσ being an LC-derivable sequent imply that iσ ∈ b, which implies that b ∈ (R
ϕ ,ψ
i )
↓[([σ ])]. For the
inductive step, assume that b ∈ (R
ϕ ,ψ
s )
↓[([σ ])]. Then every element of I↑[(R
ϕ ,ψ
s )
↓[([σ ])]] contains C(σ).
Moreover, iC(σ) ∈ b, because iC(σ) ∈Φ andC(σ) ⊢iC(σ) is an LC-derivable sequent. Hence, by
Lemma 6,
b ∈ (R
ϕ ,ψ
i )
↓[I↑[(Rϕ ,ψs )
↓[([σ ])]]] = (R
ϕ ,ψ
is )
↓[([σ ])],
which concludes the proof that b ∈ (R
ϕ ,ψ
s )↓[([σ ])] for all s ∈ S. To finish the proof, for any a, ifC(σ)∈ a,
then b⊆ a, which implies, since (R
ϕ ,ψ
s )
↓[([σ ])] is Galois-stable for any s ∈ S, that a ∈ (R
ϕ ,ψ
s )
↓[([σ ])] for
every s ∈ S. This shows that Mϕ ,ψ ,a C(σ). As to item (2),
Mϕ ,ψ ,x≻C(σ) iff x ∈ [[C(σ)]]
↑
iff x∩a 6=∅ for all a ∈ [[C(σ)]]
iff C(σ) ∈ x.
The weak completeness of LC follows from the lemma above with the usual argument.
Proposition 4 (Completeness). If ϕ ⊢ ψ is an LC-sequent which is not derivable in LC, then Mϕ ,ψ 6|=
ϕ ⊢ ψ .
